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A commentary on
A predictive processing theory of sensori-
motor contingencies: explaining the puz-
zle of perceptual presence and its absence
in synesthesia
Seth, A. K. (2014). Cogn. Neurosci. doi:
10.1080/17588928.2013.877880. [Epub
ahead of print].
In a thought-provoking article, Seth
(2014) has elaborated a combined sensori-
motor and predictive coding approach to
perception. His proposal links perceptual
presence with the counterfactual rich-
ness of predictive models in the brain,
an appealing move, which is not without
problems. Here I briefly state my main
conceptual concern with the idea. I believe
Seth can take this worry into account
by shifting the emphasis from the brain
to the worldly constituents of perceptual
presence.
There are two broad ways of inter-
preting O’Regan and Noë ’s (2001) claim
that perception depends on the mastery
of the laws of sensorimotor contingencies
(SMCs). They can be broadly depicted as
conceiving mastery as in-the-head or not-
just-in-the-head.
In-the-head notions of mastery can be
sufficiently pinned down to states in an
agent’s functional architecture. Whether
these are instantiated inside a skull or not,
pace the label, doesn’t matter; the result-
ing notion is internalist and represen-
tational. Not-just-in-the-head interpreters
(e.g., Hutto andMyin, 2013) make appeals
to non-representational forms of know-
how to account for mastery.
Seth defends a marriage of predic-
tive perception (PP) probabilistic models
(an in-the-head approach, as he acknowl-
edges) and SMCs theory (SMCT). This
union could result in a powerful new ver-
sion of SMCT, but it sounds as if one
condition is for it to abandon its unwed
enactive folly and move permanently into
the household of PP and its in-the-head
folks. Is this the inevitable option?
Refinements to PP allow Seth to explain
both perceptual content and presence;
the latter—this is the most interesting
aspect—is associated with the counter-
factual richness of predictive models. In
a related move, Beaton (2013) has also
argued that counterfactual reasoning is
a natural partner for SMCT. And yet
there remains something hard to pinpoint
about this idea. What is the exact connec-
tion between veridicality and counterfac-
tual richness? The matter is not so clear.
Perceptual content and presence are not
always so easily extricable. Witness Seth’s
own example comparing a free-standing
ellipse with the same ellipse as part of
a cylinder. A difference in counterfactual
richness produces a perceptual difference
in content! The ellipse now looks like a cir-
cle while presence seems unaffected; both
lie equally veridical on the page. Content
and presence are not independent (nor
they need to be in Seth’s account) and
it seems that counterfactual richness can
affect both.
The proposal does encourage an exam-
ination of synesthesia, a problematic case
for SMCT. Seth proposes that differ-
ent associationist theories could all be
expressed in terms of intermediate level
linkages in hierarchical generative models
(HGMs) in the brain incorporating both
the inducer and the concurrent in synes-
thetic experience. This link, he suggests,
might be resistant to alterations by the pre-
diction errors that arise as the inducer is
encountered without concurrent stimuli,
and that such resistance could be explained
by an unusually high prior precision of
intermediate level models where the asso-
ciation occurs.
Putting aside the question of whether
this is not too strong an exception for
the normal workings of HGMs—it may
not be—why would intermediate mod-
els supersede low-level error-correcting
mechanisms and so result in sustaining an
impoverished repertoire of counterfactual
probability distributions affecting concur-
rent presence (and not content) in synes-
thetes? It would be necessary to explain
why, if both content and presence are
expressed in probabilistic action-sensation
mappings, and if counterfactual richness
could affect both (ellipse-cylinder exam-
ple), then error-correcting mechanisms at
the lower level manage not to rectify for
aberrant presence in synesthetes.
Seth’s assumption, from what I under-
stand, seems to be that there is no inter-
ference between how probabilities are
encoded for actual processed stimuli and
for counterfactuals.
Let us consider our first question
again. What is the entailment between
counterfactually-rich models and percep-
tual presence? Or more generally, what is
the link between sensitivity, not so much
to counterfactuals, but more specifically to
the structure of action-dependent virtual
likelihoods (in agent and world) and the
veridicality of perception?
To answer this we must look at
where counterfactual currency is cashed
out, what is the source that informs
counterfactual probability densities at all
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levels in the hierarchy. If we follow Seth’s
proposal eventually this must happen at
the lower levels, at the interface with
the world: counterfactual sensorimotor
knowledge may then cascade through the
hierarchy, but it must be informed by
actual sensorimotor engagements. Here
is why it is risky for a PP-based the-
ory to assume that model attunement
due to lower-level prediction errors could
be prevented from propagating upwards
in cases of synesthesia: the whole idea
depends on maintaining some degree of
accuracy and precision for counterfactual
inferences too, i.e., it depends on regular
updating by interactions with the world.
The necessary involvement of the world
in determining presence shouldn’t sur-
prise us. It is here where not just actual
events can get verified but the real struc-
ture of counterfactuals too. How? A les-
son that can be derived from dynamical
operationalizations of SMCs (Buhrmann
et al., 2013), even if they have only been
explored in very simple systems, is that
there is a virtual (a nuanced sub-species
of counterfactual) structure generated in
the engagement between agent and world;
more structure than just the actual senso-
rimotor trajectory. For instance, if I walk
on a slope there is a strong downward ten-
dency for mymovement, even when I walk
uphill. This is real and does not depend
on my having enough sensitivity to detect
it. Most “nearby” trajectory options are
implied in the enacted movement. And
the deeper or shallower grasp of this local
dynamical landscape correlates with the
more or less skillful enaction.
Perceptual presence could perhaps
be defined as sensitivity to the virtual
coherence that surrounds actual action,
i.e., the real (actualized or not) aspects of
the agent-world engagement. The more
coherent they are found to be, the more
present. This would be phenomenologi-
cally consistent with Seth’s proposal.
Whether this sensitivity relies on
counterfactually-rich HGMs, or alter-
native—even non-representational(!)—
mechanisms, the fact remains that it must
also involve some worldly constituents,
but not simply as inputs for the correction
of modeling errors, because inputs are
only actual (movements, sensory activa-
tions); witness, e.g., the striking difference
in dynamical signature between a situ-
ated agent and one being fed a recorded
input (Aguilera et al., 2013). The worldly
constituents of presence play a role in
shaping the dynamical possibilities of
the agent-world coupling as in the slope
example.
If this were not the case, then presence
would be unrelated to worldliness and just
in-the-head. If we eschew this possibility,
we must also discard the sufficiency of
counterfactual modeling richness for fully
determining presence. This is not to say we
must discard it as a factor affecting our sen-
sitivity to virtuality if we were to continue
exploring marriage arrangements between
PP and SMCT; but on a more equal foot-
ing, as a theory of perception not-just-in-
the-head.
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